1) Bibliographic Data
Keohane, Robert O., Andrew Moravcsik and Anne-Marie Slaughter. (2000) “ Legalized Dispute Resolution: International and Transnational.” International Organization, V. 54-3, Summer:457-88.

2) Question(s) addressed by the author and working arguments
To distinguish between two ideal types of international dispute resolutions The formal legal differences between interstate and transnational dispute resolution have significant implications for the politics of dispute settlement and therefore for the effects of legalization in world politics. They construct two ideal types of legalized Dispute Resolution: Interstate (IDR) and Transnational (TDR) , which vary along the dimensions of independence, access and embeddednes; and compare the dispute resolutions mechanisms of the International Court of Justice (ICJ), the European Court of Justice (ECJ), the GATT and the WTO and locate them in a continuum between the two ideal types.

Dimensions or variables
Independence: Specifies the extent to which formal legal arrangements ensure that adjudication can be rendered impartially with respect to concrete state interests.
Access: refers to the ease with which parties other than states can influence the tribunal’s agenda
Embeddedness: denotes the extent to which dispute resolution decisions can be implemented without governments having to take actions to do so.

Ideal Types
Interstate Dispute Resolution: (low independence, access and embeddedness) Legal resolution of disputes takes place between states conceived as unitary actors. States are the subjects of International Law, which means they control access to dispute resolution tribunal or courts. They typically designate the adjudicators of such tribunals. The states implement (or not) the decisions of international tribunals or courts. States act as gatekeepers both to the international legal process and from that process back to the domestic level.

Transnational Dispute Resolution: (high independence, access and embeddedness) Access to courts and tribunals and the subsequent enforcement of their decisions are legally insulated from the will of individual national governments. These tribunals are therefore more open to individuals and groups in civil society. In the ideal type the sates lose their gatekeepers capacity, in reality these capacities are attenuated.

3) Conceptual references to transnational – transnationalism
Transnational dispute resolution (see above)

4) Conclusions or Final Remarks
When they examine international courts they find that the distinction between the 2 ideal types appears to be associated with variation in the size of dockets and levels of compliance with decisions. ICJ is nearer IDR, ECJ is nearer TDR. The GATT and WTO do not reflect their ideal types so faithfully.